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Sunday, 19 February 2017

4. Theory and its Impact on Training in Psychoanalysis.

It is expected that psychoanalysts will receive the idea of the need for a theory of the human subject separate from a theory of psychoanalysis, and a theory of psychoanalysis spate from a theory of psychopathology as utter nonsense. Freud and his early disciples did not see any dissections in their subject matter to make them reconsider their theory. Notwithstanding, the development of psychoanalysis and its evolution shows that those distinctions were not possible at the onset of the psychoanalytic movement, but were waiting for a later time and new changes to demand attention.
We lived close to a century with one theory that was supposed to comprise all that. Once psychoanalysis became an integral part of the Western (global) culture, those distinctions forced themselves on us, i.e., cultural and human sciences. It became clear to the thinkers and the philosophers that what was missing in their philosophy of the human subject was not the absence of a concept of the unconscious because some philosophers uncovered it and recognized it but they did not find the link between the conscious and the unconscious. The result was that each looked as if is it is an ontological entity in its own right, thus unfathomable. Psychoanalysis did not just dispel this misconception; psychoanalysis (actually Freud) showed two things about this insight: consciousness and the unconscious are one thing and are mutually affecting each other, and the link between them is not of cause-effect nature, but a structuring link in which the unconscious structures consciousness. This insight is now the attribute of all human sciences: the structure of the phenomena and not their causation. When Freud reached the early conclusions regarding psychopathology, he gave birth to the concept of Trieb (the pressure put on the mind to react) and the initiator of the process of representation (vorstellung), and paved the way for and the demise of the cathartic theory. psychoanalysis became a theory of the process of representation. Unintentionally, a theory of the human subject was forcing its way as new area of psychoanalysis that could exist and evolve outside the boundaries of a theory of psychopathology or the theory of the patient.

After many twist and turns between 1905 (infantile sexuality) and 1915 ( the wrongly called his papers on metapsychology) Freud comes to a new of his surprising insights. He re-examines the three clinical concepts of Repression, Narcissism and the unconscious ( a little later the concept of regression) to stipulate that they are not ontologically unique entities, but are complex entities that have two forms: a primal and a subsequent form (primal repression\repression proper, primary narcissism\secondary narcissism, systemic unconscious\dynamic unconscious). This division, which parallel the split between the primary and secondary processes has more than what meets the eye. But within the context of this blog I could just say that it makes a distinction between the subject and between the patient and the patient and the individual. Psychopathology resides in the domain (dynamics) of primal repression and repression proper, between primary narcissism and its secondary forms, within the three spheres of the unconscious.  The three papers of 1915 put the distinction between a theory of clinical psychoanalysis and a theory of psychopathology in new perspective. Psychopathology moved away from being caused by repression and expressed in defense mechanism to basic structural differences between the primary (primare or the origin of, and the secondary) on one side, and the primal (Ur.) which is no longer exist but is replace by a sequel. Lacan once said that we should take Freud literally: I neither remember in which seminars or understood well what he meant by that, but it is important to underline this idea. Gifted and unique thinkers like Freud get insights that they themselves do know the extent of their impact on us (mortals)’. Einstein did not know all what was dormant in putting Gravity in the context of space-time protocol.

The distinction between psychoanalysis and psychopathology is obvious when we think of the different possible links between the primal and sequel, on hand and the primary and secondary (I expanded on this point in my book:“Freud’s Other Theory of Psychoanalysis”). I know- as a clinical psychoanalyst- that not all my colleagues would agree to the importance the distinctions I am making. I respond by saying: look at the theoretical mess we have, the confusion about what is psychopathology and what is technique, how the confusion in those areas are allowing us to submit to the deteriorating condition of psychoanalysis as inevitable (to some it is an exiting period). Imagine surgeons following different books of anatomy. It is imperative to review what is left of psychoanalysis for us to learn, to teach, to practice to train and include in the rest of the clinical discipline and sciences.
Freud, and his early disciples thought of “their” psychoanalysis as one and the only theory that was; which was true for few decades. Because there was no distinction in their minds between psychoanalysis and psychopathology the two helices got confused and we-the newer generation- tried to fill the gap with whatever we thought to be psychoanalysis. We tried, from within a theory of psychopathology to form theories of psychoanalysis, so we gave all efforts, even the unintended, the attribute of ‘theories of psychoanalysis’. From ego psychology to presently the “Interpersonal Defense Theory” (the latest I heard of) we named them all new psychoanalytic theories. Unfortunately, and maybe it was natural, Freud started from the two ends of the spectrum of the two helices, so his theory started from the point of juncture between a theory of psychoanalysis and a theory of psychopathology. Thus, the theory of psychoanalysis came out very confusing. Do we approach the patient from his human subject nature, or do we approach the human subject from the dormant or inactive patient in him (or in all of us)? [ keep in mind our eagerness to find a diagnosis for " a simply an ignorant, badly brought up, unethical rich man]. 

There is a latent question in this understanding of our mess: should we not be troubled by the absence of the distinction between the three theoretical configurations? The immediate expected answer is no.  Since the patient is initially a subject, and each subject has a patient dormant in him, there is are implicit overlaps that one theory out of three separate theories? My answer to the objection a flat no. The human subject is analysed within a social frame work, the person will be approach from the commonality between the individuals of his type, and the patient is seen in a background of deviations within his intrapsychical dynamics. The three theories make us avoid the temptation of the easy idea of  the overlap.
Freud’s intuitive faculty made him approach both the human subject and the patient from the point where they meet and then divert; the unconscious. [I prefer calling it the Aconscious   because the un-conscious means undoing what was originally conscious, when in psychoanalysis the “unconscious’ is something that does not enter consciousness but sends representation that links with the preconscious from the side of consciousness. At the present time psychoanalysts are not in agreement on the connotation of the Ucs.: is it ontologically an entity, is a dynamic state of affairs, or is it a topographic system? They are also in disagreement on what to change in the patient to be more of himself as a human subject. They are did agreeing on what are  the best means to achieve what they decide to work on changing (free associating, intersubjective exchanges between patient and analysts, etc..
As the situation stands now the theoretical mess has a direct impact on training in psychoanalysis. The most apparent effect of that situation is not knowing what we should train the new generation to do. Less apparent is how to train, because the traditional (old) method was sufficient fifty years ago, when clinical psychoanalysis was still manageable and the literature was still in the making (without the schools and the theoretical plurality). Thirdly, we have to know now who should be doing the training? Previously, when psychoanalysis was still a trade to be learn from a master-tradesmen in specialized institutes of the trade it was easy to assign this responsibility to senior psychoanalysts, who were expected to be qualified to do all Those things. The were identified from the beginning as training analysts and given special status in the psychoanalytic community. It is not difficult to notice and underline in red (colour of danger) that that system relies on recycling knowledge from a generation to the next. As in all systems of recycling, material things or immaterial, we have to expect a deterioration in the outcome of the recycling; Training analysts, by definition, deliver already recycled psychoanalytic material. This is very obvious in the literature: the literature of psychoanalysis fifty years ago was full of novelty and more impressive despite being mush less rich than contemporary psychoanalysis because analysts were discovering new things. Presently, the field of clinical psychoanalysis looks as if psychopathology has dried out. More alarming, is that the contemporary psychoanalysts confuse improving theories with discovering new things. 
Tuckett (I.J.P.A, 2005) said: “It has been difficult to know what does and what does not constitute competent psychoanalytic work and so equally difficult to assess when it is being practiced and when it is not. This makes difficult any form of disciplined evaluation of the outcome of training, which has a series of problematic outcomes for psychoanalytic practice, psychoanalytic institutions and the relationship to allied disciplines and professions”. This very clear and pragmatic statement put the need for a serious review of out theoretical mess in focus. It would be really be sad (and funny too) if we-the professionals of insight-  not notice that now-a-days training in psychoanalysis has no foundation to stand on, despite all the quaffable about training analysts, certification, standards of professional competence, and which institutes to be acknowledge witch are not psychoanalytic enough. 

I will try in the near future and in a separate posting to deal with the psychoanalytic theory. It is my domain of interest and knowledge. Hopefully, the theory of the human subject will find some analyst or analysts, and some dedicated human scientist to deduced it from the abundant literature in the humanities and philosophy that are psychoanalytic (structural theories).


Addendum: Conscious Resistance:

The people who are supposed to take the steps to move training from the institutes to academia, the training analysts and the senior members of the organization, are the ones who show the most resistance to that call. Lately training has been under scrutiny and showing signs of strain. I say that with confidence because the topic of choice of the day is the training analyst. The majority of the negative aspects of training has been dumped on the flows and faults of the way training analysts are “misbehaving” {a general accusation directed to them by training analysts!!} We thus have one conclusion to reach: whatever the training analyst will do to improve training by straitening out themselves, they will fail. They will fail because training analysis at the present time- as they and we all know- is ineffective and insufficient for preparing even clinical psychoanalysts, to carry on with their specialty, Contemporary psychoanalysis needs and also demands a full time training.

Full time training can only be done in academia, because it needs more than experienced analyst to do proper training. The privileged training analysts of today claim to know it all and can take the whole load of training on themselves. This is resistance, but not the unconscious resistance we encounter in psychoanalysis. It is conscious resistance to be demoted and becoming one of several equally qualified faculty in a department of psychoanalysis. Moreover, their tenurial status in the institutes will be subject to the academic standers, which is not based on students’ idealization but on actual excellence. There is another subtle point known to the training analysts who were also in on the politics of the organization: not all training analysts are equal: there are a few who are chosen to fill the empty chairs of power when they get empty; one can lose that privilege if showed some deviation from the privileged few. We should not hope for the present training analysts who control their institutes to change.  

Saturday, 11 February 2017

3.The Theoretical Field: A Disguised Mess.
I will start with the question: do we have a theory of psychoanalysis or a theory of psychopathology?
Freud’s recognizable theories are supposed to be theories of psychoanalysis. His first metapsychology was the topographic theory which started with a conception of the psychical system. Yet, a theory of catharses was a background to the topographic theory. When he moved to the ‘structural’ model of the three agencies the background changed to be urges and resistance to their controls of the agencies (Freudian psychoanalysis was never a drive psychology like McDougall’s hormic psychology. Psychoanalysis is a theory of Trieb, wrongly translated to instinct; a theory of pressure put on the mind to represent that pressure. A third unarticulated theory is the theory of interpretation (making the unconscious conscious). The three theories were mostly theories of psychopathology with implicit reference to the psychology of the patient (the sick human subject).
Because the Freudian technique of treating psychopathology was always characterized as “free association” it was inevitable that serious confusion between a theory of psychopathology and a theory of techniques would happen, and remain unarticulated. Free association was originally a Jungian understanding of what Freud was doing, but because of the inevitable transcendence of consciousness in associating there is no real freedom in that process. The best to achieve is to listen first and understand later.  Fee association is a misnomer of the psychoanalytic technique. Yet, I do not remember or know of any mention of the distinction in the literature or the scientific meetings between the theory of psychoanalysis and a theory of practice or technique. The absence of such distinction resulted or suited the domination of the clinical concepetion of psychoanalysis and the lack of any need to look into the other distinction between a theory of the patient and a theory of subject.
The absence or lack of attention to certain aspect in the theories we adopt and use would have created deficiencies in our clinical practice, but not a mess.  The proof that what we have now is a mess started with accepting theoretical plurality, presumably for political expediency. The accepted theoretical plurality was of theories of technique and not of any theoretical merit. The discovery of psychoanalysis was the discovery of the existence of unconscious intrapsychical dynamics. I do not see or know of any open retraction of this main postulate in any of the various theories that were called schools of ‘psychoanalysis’. Therefore, it is safe to say that plurality was not theoretical. Only the means to reach that unconscious intrapsychical world started to gradually take different directions. It moved from suggesting exploring the patient’s object relations, to ego defences, fragmentations of his identity and narcissistic core, relationalities, the transference-counter transference dynamics (intersubjectivity), etc.
This diversity is still not enough to create the mess we are in, because supposedly they all were and still are seeking the patients’ unconscious intrapsychical formations. However, because of personal proclivities that were very much active in creating those variations something else happened. Clinical analyst (from their writings!) forgot that their theories are just means to an end, and considered their means to be ends, in their own right. The new schools used the classical vocabulary to mean other concept, created new vocabularies to mean different things than their ordinary connotations, and derived meanings from other sources that are related to but not typically psychoanalysis. We are now in a mess: loss of the central conception of psychoanalysis, varied techniques that are supposedly used for the same objective, disappearance of the distinction between theory as the abstraction of an objective and formulating the link between the work and the means. The critics of psychoanalysis and its serious advocate realize that we, the contemporary psychoanalysts, have considered coining new terminology and confusing theory and techniques a new way of revitalizing psychoanalysis and advancing it.

In my opinion, the current theoretical mess is the result of the deterioration in preparing and training psychoanalysts properly. The outcome is not only messing up the field of psychoanalysis; it is also the deteriorating status of psychoanalysis. Moreover, the propositions offered to dealing with the crisis reflects inadequate comprehension of that deterioration. That is how I also understand the resistance to considering a radical change in the policies of educating, training, and preparing future psychoanalysts for a new and different psychoanalysis. We, the old generation, are not equipped to doing that alone as we always though that we are unique in that field; something we hate to admit after a century of believing that are unique. 

Tuesday, 7 February 2017

This is the first two parts of a long posting.

The Double Helix of Psychoanalysis  

My views are stemming from my personal experiences as a clinician and supervisor, understanding of the history of psychoanalysis, and observing its present condition from the point of view of a clinical psychoanalyst. However, I can see that it is not right to be critical of certain things that pertain to clinical psychoanalysis without being more specific about them and not having-at least- some conception of their rightful substitutes.  Specifically, I should be able to show what would be advantageous in moving training from the present institute system to academia, not just blaming it for what I personally think of the deterioration of clinical psychoanalysis.
To do that, I intend to show first what I consider basic defects in training in the IPA accredited institutes, not based on in their wanting curricula but based on intrinsic flaws in the system itself. Firstly, there is an important attribute of psychoanalysis that was missed from the beginning, but should be underlined now so we would not miss the point and continue misunderstanding psychoanalysis. This point, when and if recognised, would show the inadequacy of the institute system, not only now but from the beginning. However, in fairness to the pioneers in training it would have been impossible for them to consider this missed point for a reason I will mention a little later. This point could have been the cause of most (if not all) the internal conflicts in our organizations.
Secondly, I will try to show that the best curriculum in this system would not meet the demands of the practice of psychoanalysis now-a-days. There is no clear admission, or serious recognition that the field of psychopathology and the pole of patients have changed since the institute system was painstakingly established over ninety years ago.  
1.Freud’s Two Areas of Interest:
Most new ideas that catch the attention of the thinkers at any  episode in history-whether in the field of physical sciences, human sciences, philosophy, or even matters of ordinary daily life, become movements. Evolution in the nineteenth century, existentialisms in the twentieth, the climate in the twenty first century were and still are, in a way, important movements, i.e., had followers and advocates who defended them from the attacks and criticisms they provoked when they were firstly originated.  A movement is not merely a novel idea, but an idea that changes an established way of thinking in the minds of, firstly a minority before it becomes the ideology of the majority. It also impacts areas outside its initial concerns. They are literally “movements”, announcing the futility of remaining in a stagnant point of knowledge and not moving beyond it. Movements, as new ways of thinking, impact the individuals’ old self perceptions and the way they previously positioned themselves in life. Most of all, successful movements, once established, they point to their future development and possible revisions.
Psychoanalysis was at its beginnings in the late nineteen hundred, just a new idea about psychopathology. It was few unorganized ideas coming from Freud; a physician treating psychoneuroses and using hypnosis as a new method. However, it became a movement, soon after, but in a peculiar way. Freud was venturing in the field of psychoneuroses and exploring new ideas about them and their treatment. He was not a pioneer in that respect but more of a follower of the French school and of his mentor J. Breuer. He wanted to make a profession of that new endeavour. At the same time, and without clear awareness or known intention, he got interested in understanding some human phenomena that did not pertain -in anyway- to psychopathology or the field of medicine. He spent over ten years studying dreams, jokes, and parapraxes, while still practicing his profession. These were issues that pertained to common and natural human phenomena and could have stimulate the mind of thinkers and philosophers and maybe a curious cultured physician! Nonetheless, Freud approach to those old puzzling manifestations of the human subject was different; he was interested in the subjective aspects in them (the structuring individual input in their formation). This unique approach was inevitably leading  to the subject’s internal psychical life and its role in structuring his psychological life in general and his psychopathological discontents too.
 He discovered that dreams, jokes and parapraxes have a latent meaning dormant behind their manifest content. The absent content of a phenomenon always-somehow- leaves traces in its manifest formation that lead to it. He became aware that everything human has a latent content that links with the manifest in particular ways.  Freud’s finding of such a misleadingly banal and insignificant matter had a major impact on the birth of psychoanalysis. Discovering the workings of the primary process in dreams, parapraxes and jokes, in addition to paying attention to the psychological factors in purely neurological conditions like aphasia, aphonia, apoplexy, etc., encouraged and enticed him, if not forced him, to abandon hypnosis. He gave up hypnotism (1892-1894) to encourage the patients to free associate instead. He was able-with the patient in full consciousness- to read in what he talks about the hidden text of the latent content. A theory of catharsis, which was the main product of the technique of hypnosis should have met its expected demise (it still hovers over psychoanalysis).  It did not, mainly because Freud continued to consider the revealed content or the unconscious equivalent to the hypnotic catharsis. Psychoanalysts- originally and for a long time- were medical people who applied to psychoanalysis the medical model of the functional theory of causes and effects. Thus, the repressed became the cause of the psychoneuroses, like an infection or a dysfunction that causes the psychoneuroses (we still think that cure comes with discovering something hidden and the more of that the better).
 In 1896, Freud called his work with patients “psychoanalysis,” borrowing the term from Breuer who used it strictly to mean the method of examining the patients’ symptoms. Freud went further to use the verb “psychoanalysing” to connote his budding new method of treatment, which was improvised to replace hypnotism. Eventually and naturally he used the term to describe his work as a whole; with natural and pathological phenomena alike. He had a good reason to do that. Beside being the same person doing both jobs he realised that his interpretation of a dreams or a parapraxis follows the same psychoanalytic method he uses in examining symptoms and doing therapy. He found out that what he discovers in his non-clinical work and in the psychoanalysing patients was the working of the primary process: forging a link between the manifest and the latent. No attention was payed to the fact that psychoanalysis has become, in a gradual way, a term that combines two- originally-separate lines of interest: psychopathology and psychodynamics.
 The few peoples who sought after Freud to learn what and how he made his discoveries knew from the beginning that they were forming a cohesive group and creating a movement. Expectedly, the early seekers of psychoanalytic knowledge were physicians, since Freud’s identity and work was the treatment of pathological conditions. Freud also knew that he was starting a movement because he realised from the beginning, and maintained this conviction till the end, that he did not discover something but he was unfolding a process of discovering things about something new (the human subject). Psychoanalysis was born, thence, as a movement. Freud and his new followers were more inclined to see the fusion of the two fields of interest and pay no attention to their fundamental separateness. They were a double helix in a singular endeavour.  The reason was rather a false or deceiving belief: it looked as if both areas of interest were supporting and confirming the findings of each other. Any serious look at Freud’s literature would show that the non-clinical area was supplying the clinical area with new insights and also better vocabulary, while the clinical aspect added very little to the psychoanalytic discoveries outside the clinical sphere. In other terms, the exchange of findings was grossly disproportionate and lopsided in favour of the non-clinical. In my opinion, clinical work produced only four discoveries: the Oedipus position, Narcissism, the deviations in the in the subject’s intrapsychical dynamics, and transference. The most obvious proof to the contribution of the non-clinical to the clinical field is Freud’s attitude toward the interpretation of Dream. For a period of time, interpreting dreams was the ‘golden road’ to the unconscious and an important part of the practice of psychoanalysis. Ultimately it became clear that doing that would interfering with the desired easy-flow of the analytic process. He recommended not sacrificing the session for a good interpretation of a dream anymore (Freud,1911 e). The Ucs. that could be discovered in dreams could also be uncovered in many other analytic material in the sessions. Nevertheless, the import of dreams remained central in psychoanalysis because “The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a)” contained the discovery of the dynamics of the primary process, the various formations of expressing ideas, the configuration of the topographic model, and several other notions that were supported by the work in parapraxes. The unequal contribution of the two lines of interest to psychoanalysis is evident in Freud’s several attempts at using the clinical discoveries in interpreting the non-clinical area. He was not very convincing in his papers on Gradiva or his work on Leonardo Da Vinci. At the same time, the two papers of “On Negation” and the “Uncanny” dealt with very central clinical issues (as I will discuss in a later posting). Without noticing, Freud was thinking and elaborating his thoughts about the human subject separately from his clinical work. His 1915 papers (the metapsychology papers confirm that.
However, the medical followers of the movement formed the majority of Freud’s early disciples, and the non-clinical ones stayed at the fringes of the movement. In addition, Freud could not realize (but we can) that he was working on two distinct features of the human subject and their separateness should be kept palpable. He, as the creator of the two helixes, did remind of their distinction from time to time, but mostly neglected this distinction. This lack of recognition made most of us clinicians, use the term psychoanalysis as synonym for clinical work and consider the non-clinical aspect merely applications of clinical psychoanalysis. The clinicians gave the movement its present identity, which does not pay attention to the necessity of having a theory of psychopathology when we work with patients, and another distinct theory about the human subject, whom we do not deal with but still we examine his manifestations and phenomena.  Most of the refusal to accept that distinction comes from clinical analyst who do not want anyone to share with them ‘psychoanalysis’ and harbour a sense of supremacy for being psychoanalysts. Working with the human subject is a distinct field that also needs their own distinct psychoanalytic theory.
 This misconstrue of the link between the clinical and the non-clinical caused several uncalled-for results; the most damaging is creating a false hierarchy of importance, legitimacy, competency, adherence to the purity of psychoanalysis, and most of all the right to speak for the movement. Clinical analysts were and still are so engrossed in the identity of the clinician that they consider themselves the only qualified authority to do the teaching and training in psychoanalysis. The result is very damaging to both clinical psychoanalysis and the other aspect, which Freud carelessly amalgamated in the clinical helix. Although the philosophers, especially the German idealists, tried for almost three centuries to get to the nature of the human subject, the window to his subjective nature remained shut to them. Freud managed to open that window and get to the intrapsychical dynamics of subjectivity, but only in his discoveries outside the field of clinical practice.  Although he had vague ambitions that one day the two helixes will unite (his letters to Fleiss), he maintained a separate but defined interest outside psychopathology and psychotherapy (from Totem and Taboo to Moses and Monotheism). His letters to Fleiss show a vague conviction that he might find in the mundane phenomena of religion, social phenomena, art and history, etc., some insights about in psychopathology.
Those two lines of interest did not come close to each other until 1905. His book on infantile sexuality and its early manifestations in childhood linked with his original interest in the role of sexuality in psychoneuroses. Sexuality as a natural urge was replaced with the concept of Trieb (wrongly translated by instinct and misled analysts since to call classical psychoanalysis drive psychology). Sexuality took a different meaning than just being a scene of some social moral preferences, or a drive of social attributes. Trieb introduced the notion of representation as the basis of psychological life. Those fundamental discoveries were not products of clinical work. However, the traditional predefined line between pathology and health prevented the clinical psychoanalysts, including the non-medical- to accept that the foundation of psychoanalysis is not in the clinic but in the psychology of the human subject.
 The distinction I am making here between the clinical (the patient) and the non-clinical (the human subject) would be considered by the clinical psychoanalysts superfluous if not facetious. We, clinical psychoanalysts do not accept the exitance of any psychoanalysis outside clinical work, and look at the efforts made by the non-clinicians to learn and work with the psychoanalytic theory as amateurish and simple attempts to have a link with psychoanalysis. There is a major mistake in this line of thinking. Because the patient is before anything and after all a human subject clinical psychoanalysis should put psychopathology in the context of a theory of the human subject: put the part in the context of the whole. But, we do not have a theory of the human subject yet and we blocked the interested of the non-clinicians from working on one to be the background for what we clinician do with the patients. At the same time, our clinical theory is presently in disarray; we no longer have a theory of psychopathology. Considering psychoanalysis a field of only clinical work forces us to see everything about the patient from the spectrum of psychopathology, which distorts our understanding of our clinical work. In my opinion: all the work and confusion about transference and counter transference, the legacy and recommendations of the wise old analysts about the patient-analyst’s relations, the acting out of transference distortions, etc., come from looking at the patient without any clear idea (theory) of the human subject that embodies the patient. As an example: we interpret the patient’s fantasy of being special from the way he constructs his social situations. Yet, we do not know how his sense of being special could be derived from his social life. If we are lucky or very good we will use the psychoanalytic jargon to guide us to the unconscious in the patient, but our theory (ies) does not tell us anything about how the unconscious (Ucs,) is formed in the human subject. I am talking here about the systemic and non-repressed unconscious, not the dynamic and topographic unconsciousness.
2.The subject, the patient and the two topics of psychoanalysis.
The separateness of the manifest from the latent is not the cause of separating the remembered from the forgotten, i.e., it is not the cause or the effect of repression. This separateness took few hundred thousand years for homo-sapiens to actualize, and generate human culture. It is an inherent qualification of any and all psychological phenomena. It is obvious that human civilization and modernity came as result of replacing primitive conceptions of the world with  realistic ideas, and  in a limited way about ourselves. Developmentally, it is noticeable in children a gradual trend to push aside the primary process way of knowing and expressing knowledge, and a parallel movement to replace it with the workings of the secondary process. This process that affects the change from primitiveness to modernity and from infancy to maturity had to deal with a simple but basic problem. The workings of the primary process, individually and socially, does not disappear (where would it go!); it lurks behind as a background for the newly acquired secondary processes. A link between the two types of processes have to be established to make homo-sapiens deal with this split, and to make the child grownup. Language emerged in the realm of homo-sapiens, as it does in childhood as a product of that separateness and the link between the primary and the secondary side of facts. Language bridges the manifest and the latent through creating links between the primary and the secondary processes, which coexist in tension.
Although Freud was not the first to recognize that separateness and the links within, which best called by Ricoeur “the equivocality of language”. Freud  was the first to put it in perspective and apply it reading a dream and listening to patients talking as the means for psychoanalyzing them. Another first for Freud ,in that regard, was identifying what is latent and what could be its manifest and the code of translation one into the other; condensation or metaphor, displacement or metonymy, and the plastic presentation of ideas (he even tried something like a dictionary of sorts in his work on symbols). But, Freud genius was in distinguishing between the language of psychopathology and the patient’s ordinary speech, i.e., the speech of the human subject and the speech of the patient within his own subjectivity. Language in the human subject links the manifest with the latent in a manner that aims at introducing them to the person to understand, while in the patient the linguistic links (in specific areas of the patient’s life) aim at disguising the latent and even mislead in reading his manifest, (or maybe is distorted by the psychopathology).
We reach here a very technical and professional point that attracted the attention of many clinical psychoanalysts but did not get a satisfying answer to all: What is the language we-clinical psychoanalysts- use in practicing psychotherapy (psychoanalyzing)? Is the psychoanalytic vocabulary apt and suitable for conveying interpretations? I will answer this equation in the next part of this posting.
Language is not only verbal, it uses more than words to link the manifest with the latent. It has the flexibility to use more than one signifier to signify the same signified, but eventually everything it uses could be made verbal. The primary process managed to say things through other means than words but could also render anything to verbalization. This feature creates a rift within the human subject that could become his psychopathology. The patient’s spontaneous proclivity is to disguise the latent content; thus, this rift should be considered  a basic attribute of psychopathology. The clinical psychoanalysts depend on the human subject in the patient n to make things get known.
 Freud’s double preoccupations was not something clearly identified or seriously considered at any stage in the history of the movement. The non- clinical analysts were not considered psychoanalysts to take their work seriously, and they remained outside the analytic movement. They were rather hesitant to show their, or call it psychoanalytic. Nevertheless, at the end of the fifties of last century and till the mid sixties there was a spontaneous outburst of non-clinical psychoanalytic activities in the world that encompassed psychologists, philosophers, cinema people, theatre, visual art, thinkers, linguists anthropoglots, etc. The sudden great revival of a previously modest and quite interested non-clinicians in psychoanalysis cemented a strange idea in the minds of clinical psychoanalysts: clinical psychoanalysts can dabble in the none psychopathological fields, but the work of the none clinical people is not supposed to be called psychoanalysis, even if it were purely related to the general theory of psychoanalysis. There is a good reason for that. The clinician has to have a pre-psychoanalytic academic knowledge and training in psychopathology. Yet, psychoanalysts gave themselves the right to delve in none clinical matters, whatever poor and limited their understanding of those issues. This discrepancy strongly suggests an inflated self-image of the clinical psychoanalyst. Worse, it indicates a wrong and distorted understanding of psychoanalysis itself.  As we will see later, the system of training and the nature of the psychoanalytic organization prescribed a peculiar situation: ‘psychoanalyst’ became an identity, but only for those clinician who were trained the accredit training institutes.
A closer look at the identity of the psychoanalysts requires some reconsideration: clinically Freud was dealing with the patient but in the non- clinical domain he was exploring the human subject. This distinction is necessary although it is likely to make some ask: isn’t the human subject and the patient one and the same? It goes without saying that they are, but in psychoanalysis they were discovered separately; the patient was apparently discovered through his symptoms and suffering when Freud was treating people with hypnosis. During that same time he discovered the human subject through his dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue, religion, art, morality, etc. The patient in psychoanalysis was a human being suffering and exhibiting symptoms but was in a way different in his sickness; he did not know that he was alienated from himself and his intrapsychical dynamics were affecting his subjectivity. Thinkers and philosophers and even popular sayings acknowledged, in different degrees, the innateness of alienation in the human subject but did not identify it as such. Freud’s approach in psychotherapy, even from the very early hypnosis phase, was to restore the human subject in the patient. Despite the pathological alienation of the subject in the patient, the subject was still there waiting to be restored.
However, the question remained unanswered: who is the “human subject” who baffled the philosopher and is supposed to gain full clarity in psychoanalysis. The clinical psychoanalyst does not see the problem this way; he remains relating to the patient as the subject who is hiding something without knowing what he is hiding. In other terms, the puzzling human subject is not recognized or noticed by the clinician because what concerned the ordinary clinician is what the subject is hiding, and to very few they how the hiding happens. Freud was more of the second type of clinician. He discovered another thing about the human subject: being susceptible to getting psychologically sick. The natural and normal psychical manifestations of the subject are malleable   enough to sometimes take the form of sickness: love becomes hate, pain becomes pleasure, remembering could go in the wrong direction, etc. this leads to the fist step toward defining the human subject: a person whose rift between the primate process and the secondary process gets affected and loses its malleability and produces fixed links which stops the subject from utilizing the advantages of the natural links between the two types of processes.
The domination of the clinical aspect in psychoanalysis was an unplanned but unfortunate event. The non-clinical aspect of psychoanalysis did not have a proper chance to be developed and the clinical analysts became convinced that developing it is part of their responsibility. Thus, the early formation of the psychoanalytic organization just happened to be a community of clinical psychoanalysts who assumed the impossible task of surviving within their created Ghetto. They did not feel the need to change that mistake even when they were facing their gradual extinction. On the contrary, they derived a certain feeling of superiority and security in keeping it that way, denying that all the living professions around them are open scientific communities.
 The most detrimental outcome of this seemingly unintentional outcome of the history of the movement was exasperated by the early way psychoanalytic knowledge was transmitted from the older who knew it to the younger who wanted to learn it. It was transmitted in the form of training (not as an education as Jane hall stipulated in a recent posting). Psychoanalytic knowledge and experience did not have a history and were still in their infancy and just started to gel into a defined theory. The old generation was right in assuming the role of teachers, trainers, the ones who had the material and the instruments of transmitting psychoanalysis from generation to generation. But now, psychoanalysis evolved enough to distinguish between its two helices and finding new details within each helix to strongly call for a major revisions of the psychoanalysis of the human subject, the clinical theory (ies), the educational models to transmit it knowledge, and its links with the other idiographic sciences.
 In the next two parts of this post I will try to address the significance and possible pitfalls of theorizing in psychoanalysis.