Audience

Saturday, 28 January 2017

I do not need proof to the validity and value of psychoanalysis; I have been for decades and still is an psychoanalyst (clinical). My concern is the laxity and flippant manner contemporary psychoanalysts are dealing with serious matters like training and research. It is a result of our self centeredness and isolation in our psychoanalytic community, which is no longer of any importance to anyone but us. The poor quality of  contemporary psychoanalysis is alarming but most of us are not paying attention to being shadows in the old great hall of psychoanalysis. 
I will try as much as possible for me to push for opening up the psychoanalytic community to relearn psychoanalysis from those who know it better than us. We have become like the good old indian widows who had to die when their husbands die. Psychoanalysis as we have rendered it in the last four or five decades is dying-as thought, theory, new knowledge even as a psychotherapy.  We will die with it if we do not stop being the conceited professionals we have become. 

Wednesday, 25 January 2017

Research in Psychoanalysis:  

Eighty or ninety years ago, we were a highly respected lot of professionals: we were discovering new and fascinating things about the human subject. We created a unique vocabulary and but used it carelessly. Fifty years later we were expected to account for our discoveries by people who were not part of our closed community. Karl Popper questioned our way of thinking because we started to use our vocabulary as if it is the discovery itself. Eysenck demanded proofs to what we presumed to be facts. Instead of looking into those criticisms we tightened the noose around ourselves and ignored criticism. Gradually but surely, we felt inferior to other professionals. Then came the thought that research is the means to proving our worth. It was a regrettable thought because all what we had in mind is to imitate research done in psychology and psychiatry, not realising that psychoanalysis is not a psychology or a psychiatry.    
Research is meant to exact answers to floating questions that could sometimes take the form of a hypotheses. To start, we have to eliminate the two notions that there are quantitative researches and qualitative researches and that quantitative research is better. You say: “Practically, all research is initially qualitative-by definition-otherwise from where do hypotheses emanate? In good (my emphasis) research, one usually moves from qualitative to quantitative”. To take a short cut: if all research start qualitatively and end quantitatively thus this criterion is indiscriminative. The criterion that is discriminative, and pertains to psychoanalysis too, is the nomothetic sciences and the idiographic sciences. Because the physical world’s exitance is independent of the researcher (except in quantum physics) we can research it- via experimental work- and come to exact answers to its questions, because the experiments are replicable and stand the variation of the research circumstance. In human sciences, it is impossible to reach answers through experimentation, because the subject in any experiment is a constituent of the circumstances of the experiment. Just to underline this point: all nomothetic researches start with a hypothesis (a question that needs an answer of the type of yes or no, correct or wrong, equivocal or definite). The reason is that we can experiment with the physical world, i.e., to eliminate in a systematic way the possible contaminations of the phenomenon we are researching. Quantitative measure in that field of research is not an after though but is the basis the scientist is going to base his conclusions on. The quantitative results are decided by the way the hypothesis needs to be addressed.
 In contrast, I will propose hypothetical experiment in human sciences about dreams. I take the last twenty dreams of my patients’ and interpret them, showing that the strings of association about each part of the dream intersect with other strings at particular points and in the same particular way. I use that to prove that they all link a day residue with an infantile wish. This research would mean nothing because I have to show that my colleague Dr. D.  has reached the same conclusion reviewing the same data, which is not a reasonable expectation. Moreover, my colleague Dr. D.  should do the same thing with twenty dreams of his patients and I should corroborate his interpretations. This is what research in psychoanalysis should be if we want to use the experimental model of research.  I not only doubt that that this is what was in Dr. Seitler’s mind when he talks about research in psychoanalysis.
However, since experimental psychologists invented the system of rating scales some research was done using them in social psychology, educational studies, etc. [Rating scales have to be subjected to very scientific scrutiny to be used as research tools. Be ware of what you wish for]. There are differences between research and methodical, systematic exploration or assessment of human phenomena. The maximum we should aspire for in the psychoanalytic field is to come up with phenomena of psychoanalytic relevance to explore and examine them in a methodical and systematic ways. This is not an easy thing to do. We might be tempted chose what we think is psychoanalytically important, create our own rating scales. decide the method of quantifying what observe, make comparisons and com to conclusions. This would not be research because the psychoanalytic issues that could be studied that way comprise unconscious elements that- by definition-are undefinable to be observed. If we want to examine -in a methodical way- the changes in the positive and negative features the transference in treatment of two different disease entities or the beginning and the end of an analysis, we would be observing the Cs., and Pcs. manifestations of transference.

Thus, research or methodical exploration in psychoanalysis be with issues and not ideas and concepts. An example, if we notice (I did) that patients who do not have a sense humour are less acceptable of partial interpretations, which sometimes are necessary. A research in the evolution of humour in human subjects (by an intuition Freud studied jokes very early in his career to show how humour is based on partial recognition of metaphors and metonymy) could be useful in showing how an infant smiles to his mother’s baby talk, a little later giggles to a peek-a- boo game, then to “knock-knock” in adolescences, then humor in adulthood, and the ability to understand and use metaphors in social communication and understand later in life. It would also help the analysts to gradually shoe the patient that his symptom is a metaphor of childhood experiences. Those kinds of research are only possible in university setting because they require more than a clinical psychoanalyst.  

Sunday, 22 January 2017

Part Six: Epilogue
For a long time, it baffled me as a training analyst, that we were- in Canada- unsatisfied with our training system, but we only tinkered with some of its details, which did not satisfy us either. This was also the situation in most of the training institutions in the different parts of the world, as our colleagues acknowledged in personal communication and in the biannual pre-congress meetings of the IPA. My bafflement dissipated gradually when I discovered -in myself too- that we are attached to a system of training that we inherited, because it fitted well the closed community of psychoanalysts, which we cherished blindly. Opening up our closed community would have required changing our system of qualifying psychoanalysts and giving up the desire to keep it closed. Changing the system of training would have resulted in opening up our analytic community to others (none clinical psychoanalysts). Dr. Kernberg, who was and still is critical of our training system says: “I believe that the educational stagnation…of psychoanalytic education derives largely from the present-day training analysis system as a major source of inhibition of the educational process (Division Review, Autumn 2016,13). He mentions as one of the factors in the resistance to change isolating the institutes from the scientific and academic fields, thus all the elements that contribute to training remain within the closed circle of psychoanalysts who assume all these responsibilities. He is more open to some changes in the present situation but does not see more than ameliorating what has been the cornerstone of the Institute System. However, Kernberg offers a view of an model institute of the future; an institute that does not exist yet.
He recommends four main things to ameliorate training as conducted now- a-days:
1.    Establishing objective assessment methods of competency regarding the candidates’ theoretical knowledge, acquisition of technical expertise and developing a psychoanalytic attitude (creating a speciality Board for that purpose). He stipulates theoretical knowledge as an amalgam of some of the familiar concepts- though fundamental- in the literature, like motivation, structure, development, the spectrum of defense mechanisms, etc.  (ibid,14). This amalgamation of concepts does not indicate a strong theoretical base. I had candidates who knew all those concepts, in addition to the improvised concepts of the new schools without understanding them or differentiating between knowing concepts and developing a theoretical stance.  He considered technical expertise the intuitive understanding of the material, formulating notions about understanding such analytic material and giving them appropriate interpretations. I also had candidates who were gifted in that regard but inappropriate in the timing or the verbal expression of their understanding (supervision has little input in teaching those subtleties). The aspect of the psychoanalytic attitude is not clarified in Kernberg’s paper, but in my opinion the most determining factor in that respect is the analyst’s character. In training, we discover the future psychoanalysts but we do make of the candidate the psychoanalyst of the future.

2.    The supervisory functions in the new system would be separate from certifying the candidates. The supervisory function would be responsible for evaluating the training faculty based on measures of productivity and creativity and other features of skill and distinction. With tongue-in-cheek, Kernberg sees some advantage in connecting with the university departments of psychology, psychiatry and the university centres of psychoanalysis, in that regard. He realises that the institutes-unsupported by the academics of psychoanalysis and the human sciences- would not survive long.

3.    The key point in his proposal is RESEARCH. He considers research as a vital part of any future training modality; even proposes creating a department of research in every training institute. Kernberg is not careful in using this term. Researcher is an act of deciding what is right, proven, categorically different from other things, quantitively measurable, and most importantly misunderstood because of being undifferentiated from other aspects of the phenomena that are implicitly mixed with the subject of the research. It also depends on the experimental model to examine the hypotheses. What Kernberg calls research is just attempts at using quantifying measuring scales to allow methodical description of purely subjective conceptions. The two examples he gives (suggested by Tuckett and Korner) show the distinction I mentioned here. Research is not the solution to problems but the topic to be researched is the problem; it has to be solved by defining it within a research hypothesis first, before it is researched. 

4.    Adding to the curricula the literature of other psychoanalysts beside Freud and the legendary characters in our traditions (which is actually done but maybe less that what Kernberg would like). He also suggests teaching issues like the recent the neuropsychological findings, principle of experimental psychology, developmental psychology, etc.  As a psychologist who studied those subjects academically, and practiced some and wrote about most of them in addition be being a training faculty in an active institute (in my time) I have to think seriously: how could we include all those things in the curricula of an institute that requires three hours a week for seminars, four hours a week (at least) of personal analysis, three more hours of supervision in addition to at least fifteen hours of psychoanalytic work with supervised patients,  and earn a living at the same time. Dr. Kernberg’s proposal is about an ideal system of training that cannot be sustained in the present institute system of training. This if we want psychoanalysis to become a profession in its own right.

Fifty years ago, all what was known about the human subject was easy to condense in the institutes’ curricula. What is presently done in our training institutes is less than what is required in an undergraduate degree in the subject of psychoanalysis (B.A. in psychoanalysis). A regular clinical psychotherapist, who wants to do psychoanalytical psychotherapy needs two or three more years of core psychoanalysis at the level of a curriculum of a M.A. (in psychoanalysis). To qualify for psychoanalysis the candidate needs either a higher Diploma in clinical psychoanalysis or a Ph.D. in psychoanalysis. This is the way to approach education in psychoanalysis; examining the field, the minimum requirement for each level of practice, matching the requirement to the demand of competence. Somethings similar have to be done for none clinical psychoanalysis [which is imperative if we want clinical psychoanalysis to survive and flourish]. But that should be mainly done by the academicians of the related human sciences.
My basic idea about training is to phase out the training institutes sponsored by the local, national and international psychoanalytic societies and move training to the academic domain. I would not have written a better post or paper to support my views than Dr. Kernberg’s paper. It is uncanny that he is proposing innovations in the education of psychoanalysis, which would be easy and natural to execute in universities without reservations, and meet more than what stipulated as measures for success.
The obstacle in accepting this point of view is the chronic pride of the clinical psychoanalysts (it is also called narcissism). They want to be the authority of certifying themselves, forgetting that they are initially certified by their original profession to practice; being it psychoanalysis or something else. Psychoanalytic certification of the title “psychoanalyst” is only important to the certified psychoanalysts, but not to anyone else. However, a university degree in psychoanalysis is something else.

I will be posting a new long post on missing a central point in the nature of psychoanalysis, which created the chronic (false!) pride of the clinical psychoanalyst, and was always the undeclared reason for the chronic conflicts in the psychoanalytic organizations.   

Wednesday, 18 January 2017


Few weeks ago, reverting to the issue of Psychoanalysis and Academia in response to JAPA's Volume 64 (3) which had an open discussion on the subject, I started a long post (six parts) on my blog. I was able to publish only four parts before something went wrong and the blog was blocked. After an UNBELIEVABLE trip in the area of blog creation I managed to get this one. It is ahmedfayekphd.blogspot.ca

When I was ready to publish the six parts (following this preamble) the topic was revisited by C. Jacobs,, O. Kernberg,and D. Nobus in Division[39]Review. I intend to write an epilogue to my post.

I will write few notes on occasion and publish them in my blog. However, I will announce that on the pipeline so the interested would know. Yesterday my last book :Explaining the Classical
Theory of Psychoanalysis was published.
Once More
Psychoanalysis and the Academy:
One
This Post is a response to a recent discussion on the issue of psychoanalysis and the academy in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association (Volume 64. #3, June 2016). It should have been properly written as a paper on the raised issues in the volume, but I did not find the energy and the endurance to engage in a well vetted paper. However, I will try my best to avoid the temptations to be slack in raising issues and expounding them. I will make sure that scrutinizing this paper will prove that it came from documented literature and be put to shame.
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1.The theory of content and the theory of process:
I approached this subject before in regards to the dropping interest in psychoanalysis and moving analysis to academia could save it from ominous demise. I centered my arguments then on two issues: the insistence of the analytic organization on considering psychoanalysis a profession, when it has only the features of a ‘guild’ or a trade, and is officially and legally an appendage to three main professions: psychology, psychiatry and social work. Thus, it is unable still to gain the respectable status of a certifiable profession (by a third party), The second issue is insisting on preserving the traditional system of qualifying psychoanalysts through apprenticeship instead of education, and putting the emphasis on “professional standards” of the trainers and the trainees instead of on the qualifying methods of educating and training the applicants for certification. In more relevant words to the contemporary psychoanalysts’ minds: not to look for standards of professional competence in the trainers and the trainees but in the system of training itself. It is paradoxical-to say the least- to expect the society to accept and certify graduates of our training centers when those centers have no indication or the proof that their taring qualifies its graduates. It is like the church which qualifies its clergy, abut not like faculty of law preparing its graduate to sit for ‘bar’, the real test of competency. 
In this post-which is going to be long and divided into sections- I want to be less tentative in saying what I know would raise the backs of the training analysts, most of the analyst who have certified themselves, and the candidate who would not accept certification from anyone else but their mentors, who “somehow” convinced them that psychoanalysis is not for the public but for the fortunate few who are accepted in the institutes. I am saying that because the issue is not whether psychoanalysis is something unique-which I will support later on but differently, but because the emphasis those mentor, whom I was one before I retired, put on eth acceptance to training and not what training is.
The history of training shows two characteristics: Training came as an afterthought. It started as a means to put some order in the burgeoning interest in joining the pioneering psychoanalysts of the twenties and thirties of the last century. Abraham and Eitingon started the enterprise to discovered that it is a very involved one. At the beginning the issue was to give the candidates some didactic training by undergoing a period of psychoanalysis. Shortly after, it became clear that psychoanalysis is developing into a trade (not a profession yet) and needs to adopt a more extensive system of transmitting knowledge and experience from one generation to the next. This almost surprising awareness pushed the international Training Committee to recommend increasing the period of training and created a tripartite model of training. Gradually but rather quickly the system of the Training Institutes became a fact of life in the life of the newer generations of analysts.    
In natural way the selection of the trainees and the criteria of ‘the good’ analyst became an issue, and the psychological health of the analyst was considered a main part of training. This issue evolved quietly to give didactic analysis the new function of therapy, and in no obvious way it became the central point in training. The main point of therapeutic analysis as the main part in the tripartite system changed the whole idea of training. In the first-place candidates were selected by analysts (training analysts) who will take the responsibility of choosing the right future analysts. Secondly, the training analysts had to be chosen too, thus another game of nepotism and favoritism had to develop. The closed circle of the psychoanalytic guild created an inner circle of master guilder psychoanalysts. Psychoanalysis changed into a ‘culture’ of those who know and those who know, but less. A. Freud addressed that issue as early as 1939 and expressed concerns about its effect on training, as Eitingon kept reminding of its silent yet negative quality in almost every annual report on training since the beginning (1928). Balint, Benedek, Bernfeld, Heiman, Langer,Van der Leeuw also made some profound observations on the same issue of taring changing into some sort of a system of creating a cult instead of just creating a guild. This innocent development caught the attention of some senior analysts like Limentani and Calif. Limentani even said: “Institutional training is probably antithetical to psychoanalysis” (1974).
Before we get any further it is important to underline somethings in the critical literature of the old literature (before the sixties).  The training system of the psychoanalysis was a necessity and still is, but it was never-ever- satisfactory since its birth in 1924-25. Training was needed because psychoanalysis by then has thrived and the number of analysts and their dispersion in many places made the IPA demand having a handle on the membership. If we add to that the development of the theory by the increased membership and their contributions to the literature, the notion of standardizing training was a natural product of those changes. In addition, there was already a body of knowledge that required streamlining to be part of the theoretical foundation of the new generation of psychoanalysts. Yet, in the late twenties and the thirties psychoanalysis was still unaccepted by the physicians to attach it to psychiatry, and its acceptance by psychology was not enough to change it from a guild to a profession. What is unnoticed or not dealt with in that literature is the awareness of the founders (S. Freud, Eitingon, Bendik, A Freud, Sachs and others) of significant flaws and defects in the “system” of training but their helplessness in dealing them, and declaring their dissatisfaction by just mentioning them. What they were unsatisfied with is what the next generations became aware of and even contributed to entrench the flaws in the system and amplify them., despite the continued awareness of their detrimental result   aware of the difficulties and the mistakes, which the next generation of dissatisfied analyst were able to define and verbalize: the conduction of training in an unhealthy environment according to psychoanalytic standards and conception. The best articulation of the dismay about training is expressed by Safouan (2000): “The institutionalization of psychoanalysis was like a ‘repetition’ or ‘rehearsal’ which enacted without the ‘actant’s being aware, the myth pronounced by Freud in Totem and Taboo, of a ‘fraternal’ deal dictated by a murder…” . The criticism of training was conscious and for conscious reason, therefore there is no escape from asking what was the unconscious inhibition to correct it?  The conscious answer is: what else? In the issue of JAPA I mentioned above Kernberg and Mitchels suggest modifications and improvements in the training system that would be best done within an academic milieu.
I will come to those suggestions later but for now we have to seriously consider this next point:
Soon after the end of WWII, the settlement of the migrating analysts in their new countries there was a boom in the field of the theory and also practice; consequently, in training. We should pay attention to the change in the theory because it was the origin of the plurality of schools of psychoanalysis that has impacted training in major ways. The first and most serious development in that area was in England, resulting in accepting- for the first serious way- the possibility of having two systems of training based on differences in the theoretical backgrounds. The “Controversies” of 1947 were relegated to personal conflicts between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. They were more significant that such limited understanding. Take for instance the term Identification and consider its meaning in Freudian and Kleinian psychology. Anna Freud coined the concept of identification with the aggressor. For her identification was an outcome of a defensive process, a psychical condition resulting from fear, an element of the intrapsychical structure of the ego. Klein’s projective identification is initiation of a constructive intrapsychical process that establishes a particular relationship with the other. In one theory Identification is the outcome of psychical processes, and in other it is the process the process itself. Although the British Society established a two training branches as a political solution to the conflict it was in fact a very fundamental decision: training follows the theory and not the other way around. I am almost certain that this issue was not seriously considered in any discussion about training at any stage. The reason is as peculiar as the peculiarity of missing it.
Any theory, nomothetic or idiographic, leads to a point where it has to be revised (I discussed this matter in a book that will be published in January). Therefore, psychoanalysis must have been a theory due to a revision (I will not do that in this post). However, we should consider the various splits that happened as early as 1910 of Adler and Jung, the acrimonies of Ferenczi and Rank were poor and premature revisions of the theory. But in the fifties in England, France, and the US the splits were for clearer attempts at revising the theory albeit still under the umbrella of the IPA.  
Before Freud the human subject was ‘the human being’ who ununderstandably generates his personal life and participates in creating social life. Nothing was understandable of how those things happen. I would say with confidence that Freud’s remarkable contribution to humanity started with discovering the intrapsychical. He discovered that what makes the human being what he is, is unconscious psychological processes, i.e. the presence of intrapsychical life, which what turns the human being into a human subject and not just a superior primate. This is another way of saying that the discovery of what is human in the human being is an unconscious psychological life, which by being unconscious could be called metaphorically inner. At the beginning Freud thought that human sexuality is the cause and source of what was named then ‘hysteria’. As we all know, Freud did not seize discovering, reconfiguring, and rearticulating his findings. One thing was clear: he was eager   and hopeful to find a formulation of the intrapsychical life to be like the final statement of his efforts. When he came to the formula of ego -psychology he thought for a while that is it; it was a neat way of visualizing the intrapsychical. Luckily it was Freud and not some other person and he still had few years to live to find out that ego psychology is reifying psychical life and emptying of life. He went back to his most intuitive concept of the psychical system (the topographic model) and reintroduced it to the deceptive ego-psychology.
Freud was concentrating on discovering more elements, components, divisions, constituents of the intrapsychical life of the subject. He believed, and many analysts still believe that the psychoanalytic theory is theory of contents: trauma, deprivation, defenses, abnormalities, issues, etc. Yet what he did but missed is discovering how the intrapsychic creates the psychological nature of the subject and establishes the kind of interpersonal relations with others. In other words: after uncovering the intrapsychical he was intuitive enough to discover the unconscious intrapsychical in the interpersonal quasi conscious life of the human subject. The splendid trip through the intrapsychical led him to understand the natural byproduct of interpersonal. Freud had two theories of psycho analysis (see my book on Freud’s Theory of Psychoanalysis): one about content and one about process. The split between the Freudians and the Kleinian in the late forties, the Paris society and the French Association in the fifties, and within Ego Psychology and between Ego Psychology and Self Psychology was replicating the same thing: Is psychoanalysis a theory of psychical contents or of the psychical process irrespective of the content?
I venture and spell out my deep belief that the issue of training in psychoanalysis and moving it to academia is related to that split in our theory. If psychoanalysis is a theory of psychical content then the Institute System is the place to train under the traditional tripartite protocol, and moving it to academia, as Kernberg and Michels are suggesting, would not be beneficial and would not be acceptable in Academia. If we realize that the outdated theory (theories) of content has to be gradually phase out we could then relinquish the Guild system of training and go for the academic system of education.

Before I leave this section of my post I should underline that my point of view is based on a a different understanding of the Freudian revolution. Thus, it is expected that my views would not be agreeable to those who limit his enterprise as on limited the creation of a psychotherapy theory that might have some peripheral applications.
Once More
Psychoanalysis and the Academy:

Two:

This Post is a response to a recent discussion of the subject of psychoanalysis and the academy in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association (Volume 64. #3, June 2016). It should have properly written it as a paper on the raised issues in the volume, but I did not find the energy and the endurance to engage in a well vetted paper. However, I will try my best to avoid the temptation of being slack in raising issues and expounding them. I will make sure that scrutinizing this paper will prove that it came from documented literature and not be put to shame.
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2. Language and the theory of psychoanalysis:
Freud’s discovery of the intrapsychic was a major event in the history of epistemology; and maybe because he did not note all its significant repercussions. He discovered that the human subject could be understood, thus ‘everything human’ was then subject to study.  Humanities were born. Although he went on to discover more of the intrapsychic and its content he was revealing something unique about psychoanalytic thinking: the human subject as well as human phenomena comprise two different entities; a manifest entity and a latent entity which are linked to each other in a different way than the links between the components in each entity separately. I will get to that later but for now Freud showed that conscious components- as well as unconscious components- link to each other in a functional way (cause\effect), while the link between the conscious and the unconscious components link with each other structurally.
Freud’s search for the content of the intrapsychical led him to originate the theory of psychoanalysis. Clinical analysts concentrated on the content of the intrapsychic because it was promising a theory of causation which is what a therapist aspires to have. The theory was functional expression of what was discovered. The pressure of an incompatible urge causes its repression thus creates symptoms.  Repression weakens the go so it resorts to new identifications that could make it regain some of the lost narcissism; and so forth. A theory of functions and content gives psychoanalysts a sense of being scientific because they makes them explain things. But what about the tool of configuring the theory and expressing it? What about the language of psychoanalysis? 
There is basic differences between the languages of the nomothetic sciences (physical) and the idiographic sciences (humanities). Nomothetic sciences have languages that fix a meaning to a word, a symbol, or a sign. Those languages are universal and a chemist in Greece understands the formula he receives from Norway about a chemical reaction. In the humanities scientists use the local or the most dominant language in the field. However, there are definite chances that in translating the vocabulary of one language to the other some of the connotations or the denotations get distorted or lost. In describing a human attribute of some sort in one society might be misconceived in another. Scientists in certain areas of the humanities, being aware of that flaw in their vocabulary try and succeed in anticipating the confusion and make the effort to remedy it.
Psychoanalysis is in a big disadvantage in that regard. Freud’s discovery was of very common human attributes yet he had to use the daily language to give those attributes new specific meanings. Both his understanding of what he discovered kept changing as language itself changes as a natural process. Added to that is translating a vocabulary that is neither accurate enough nor has a stable signification makes the theory of psychoanalysis quite wanting. The worst part of this difficulty is the psychoanalysts’ unshaken belief that they know what they mean by what they they say and that others understand what they say. This stubborn conviction is manifested in the continuous birth of new schools of psychoanalysis. The birth of new schools of psychoanalysis raises a flag: the language of a society undergoes changes that reflect social change. Does the change in the meaning of psychoanalytic vocabulary reflects a change in psychoanalysis?

Before I answer this question, I have to emphasize that despite all those issues in the theoretical validity of the psychoanalytic theory, we still have a psychoanalysis. All the theories of psychoanalysis- since the beginning of the deviations- were theories of content and of functional nature. If we scrutinize well Freud’s own revisions of his theory they were revealing a structural aspect in the prevailing content version of his theory. Because all the conflicting theories of psychoanalysis are content theories and of functional nature, not one could claim that it is better or the only best. 
The functional theories are about ‘psychoanalytic things’ defenses, conflicts, fantasies, transference, etc. At a higher and more sophisticated level they are about what, why, and when do things psychological happen when they happen. They use a known, and almost concrete concept, to explain another known and almost concrete concept, in a new way. This is what plagues the contemporary literature which is recycling older ideas. Studying two conscious ideas or two unconscious ones generate functional conclusion. This kind of theoretical knowledge or exercise could be communicated from generation to generation in institutes like the ones we have now: learning what Bion said about the primary process, and what Greenacre said about construction and reconstruction. There could also be some training in in those institutes in applying this knowledge in an ongoing supervision. 

Because the attributes of the human subject, in the basic Freudian conception, is the outcome of a conscious\preconscious system and an unconscious system in a dynamic interaction, a true psychoanalytic theory should not and cannot be a functional theory. The link between the Cs\Pcs systems and the Ucs. system is not causal, direct, logical, laying  there to be found or to be deduced from the human givens. If givens are psychological then they have to be psychoanalyzed. If they are social they have to be socially analyzed.  This is a very contentious issue in the psychoanalytic circle, especially lately. Do we have a psychoanalytic theory of social phenomena? Do we have a theory of the psychology of societies?
My answer is no: we do not have such things. It is absolutely wrong to individualize a social phenomenon and treat it as a person we have some vocabulary to describe psychologically. Nevertheless; we have a psychoanalytic method of thinking and working, which applies to all things human. Just a reminder of the most banal in the Freudian discovery: everything human has a manifest given and a latent content and the link between them is subject to the workings of the primary process.  So, a patient’s lateness to his sessions would be analyzed in the same way the crushing of a glass by the groom in a Jewish wedding. In both events, what we seek is the place of the human act in the psychical meaning of the whole event i.e., lateness in this patient’s analysis, and the crushing of the glass in the Jewish weddings.


This aspect would get us into the fundamental differences between content functional theories and process structural theories. Getting there in the proper way would shed light on the difference between training in the present institute system and the academic system of educating future analysts.


Once More
Psychoanalysis and the Academy:
Three:

This Post is a response to a recent discussion of the subject of psychoanalysis and the academy in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association (Volume 64. #3, June 2016). It should have properly written it as a paper on the raised issues in the volume, but I did not find the energy and the endurance to engage in a well vetted paper. However, I will try my best to avoid the temptation of being slack in raising issues and expounding them. I will make sure that scrutinizing this paper will prove that it came from documented literature and not be put to shame.

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Psychoanalysis and structuralism:

My aim in this section of the post is to argue that academia is the right place for psychoanalysis- as a theory of psychical structures- to evolve and develop further. I made a prelude to this idea by making a distinction between functional theories and structural theories.  Therefore, I need to make a short introduction to structuralism in general, because structuralism has become the main framework of the humanities, to the extent that it is almost unmentioned anymore as the framework of the humanities or a separate issue in the field. It goes without saying that now sociology, anthropology, history, literary critiques, etc., are structural endeavors and their methodology is structuralist. This introduction might seem to most clinical psychoanalysts superfluous because they are not totally convinced that psychoanalysis is an ideographic science and not part of the nomothetic sciences. This point, which seems irrelevant to a degree, is the main problem with Kernberg and Michels’ argument in their project to save psychoanalysis by housing it in universities.
In 1725 Giambattista Vico (Italian Jurist) brought to attention that regardless of the degree of civility or education humans have a natural proclivity to organize their societies and their perception of reality, and structure them spontaneously (unconsciously !!) creating, thus, organizations and categories. In all societies, primitive or developed, the tool to create and maintain its structures is intrinsically linguistic. His observation was neglected for over a century but eventually some thinkers, Hegel and Marx in particular expounded Vico’s observations and acknowledged the existence of a duality in every structural quality in human society: an apparent content and a latent process that governs an unconscious course of changes. The apparent content seems to be ‘things’ like kinship relations, and creates the vocabulary that gives it stability, stagnation, and invariability (mother, cousin, brother, etc.). The latent, on the other hand is unnoticeable processes that structure those relationships according to principles like incest, for instance, thus creates the organization of the family. Moreover, the latent is a process that effect change in the organization that was created before, and structures it according to those changes. Both Hegel and Marx identified that spontaneous processes as dialectical, like the role of the mode of production in creating new social classes. The significance of this development in the perception of human society is recognizing that humans live a reality of their own making, although unconsciously. It is useful if not indispensable to give some explanation to the terms used. Saussure says that what is important about humans is not oral speech but the faculty of creating languages. Sapir emphasizes that the real world is, to a large extent, the product of the social language that structured it. That means, analysis of that kind will quickly reach the level of those unconscious categories that create our worlds. But all the efforts made before to have a good idea of that latent unconscious process failed because it was noticeable no one managed to identify it or identify its immediate impact on the apparent and the manifest. The functionalist who were aware of the limitation of their theories, but the pioneer structuralists were unable to get to two cardinal things in structuralism: the link between the denotations of apparent ‘things’ and their implicit connotations. They were aware of metaphoric expressions and metonymic representation but did not know their working in creating the world of the human subject.
This is where Freud and psychoanalysis got into the fray. Freud started revealing the workings of those two processes thus was able to begin the voyage from the manifest to the latent. The most impressive and eventually fascinated the intellectual world was showing the workings of metaphor and meronomy in action. He started by interpreting dreams and showed those things in action. In the Irma dream, he honed in on the structure of the chaotic scene of re-examining Irma, which was the ignorance of all the doctors except him. This was a first structuring idea in the dream. Then relating it to the day’s residues demonstrated the workings of a primary manner of saying things and the expression of his exoneration.  Yet he sensed that all what is manifest is right and functionally linked, but the roundabout way of saying what it said must be an old childhood wish, without which a dream was not possible to form. The Interpretation of Dreams, was the first true structuralist work on a human phenomenon. It was followed by Psychopathology of Everyday Life, the Three Contributions to the Theory of Sexuality. Freud kept on demonstrating his discovery and showed how it various human phenomena including social, mythical, historical and even literary phenomena. The most remarkable thing that dazzled the world was his ability to read the unconscious in what is conscious, thus crossing the barrier between the unconscious and consciousness by letting the primary process provide him with intuitions. Thinkers of all walks of life were shocked and fascinated by Freud’s intuitions. A good evidence to that is how intuitions look less impressive now that we think psychoanalytically in our daily life.
A last detail about structuralism that we learned from Freud is the difference between functional thinking (deduction) and intuition (induction). In simple terms ‘deduction’ is concluding a cause-effect relationship between of the details of an event and making a statement about that deduction (moving from the parts to a total). Induction is inducing from the total of details the event a structural principle (dreams are wish fulfillment). Intuitions were always the starting point in the main human discoveries. Once they were established to be intuitions and not merely a bright whim, they open the gates for the discoveries that become nomothetic sciences. Darwin’s’ intuition that changes in the forms of organs are product of evolution and not of mere chance created more than just the biological sciences of our time. Likewise, turning an unconscious structuring principle in a human phenomenon starts as some intuition and proceeds to become a science. Since psychoanalysis is the dealing with unconscious material then intuition and inductive thinking plays a major part in our daily work. As the case in structuralism: discovering the structural principle of a phenomenon leads to seeing and uncovering more of the individual details-conscious and unconscious- in the phenomenon, and keeps us putting order in the details. We reach a stage where we need a new intuition to reconstruct what we constructed. Is this not a reminder of what we do in therapeutic psychoanalysis.
This condense introduction brings us to few central questions about psychoanalysis:
1.      Is psychoanalysis a trade that one can be trained in, learning how to master the skill of making functional sense of its parts, a profession that needs to learned and know how its parts need structuring effort?
2.      As a trade the system of training institutes is sufficient, but as a profession that system is not adequate to form the psychoanalysis. Does the academic system the proper place for the formation of psychoanalysts? How it will differ from the training system of the institutes?
3.      If the structural nature of the psychoanalytic theories depends on the intuitive ability of the analysts is it reasonable to think that we could train people to be intuitive?
4.      Is psychoanalysis a trade to learn or a profession to study?


Answering those question would be done properly when we review Kernberg and Michel’s proposition for improving training and delegate that to academia.